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PRE-INDUCTION AVAILABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO CLAIM
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
MOUNTING pressures of pre-induction procedure under the Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act,' culminating in the traditional "Greetings"
which prefaces the Army's standard Order to Report for Induction may, by
their immediacy, impel an honest man, previously deep in moral conflict, to
realize that he is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.2
If such an individual can successfully establish that his conscientious objec-
tion is in good faith and religiously based, the Act, in its scheme of deferments
and exemptions,3 grants him an absolute exemption from combatant training
and service.4 Although statutory language is not explicit, its tenor suggests
that the right to claim an exemption was intended to be available up to the
moment of induction. But under present regulations, apparently intended for
general application to the system of postponement and immunity from mili-
tary obligation, claimants of conscientious objector status have been unable
to secure reopening of their classifications and hearings upon the merits of
their claims where their claims have been filed subsequent to mailing of the
Order to Report for Induction, even though prior to actual induction.0
Whether this regulatory foreclosure of the opportunity to establish a con-
scientious objector exemption may be justified as a "reasonable part of an or-
derly administrative process," 6 or as consistent with the intent of the govern-
ing statute will be the focus of this Note.
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act provides
in part that:
Nothing contained [in this Act] ... shall be construed to require any per-
son to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of
1. 62 Stat. 604 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1958). This Act, formerly known
as the Selective Service Act of 1948, was reenacted in 1951 as the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act and has been amended at least once a year since then. The greater part
of legislative history relevant to this Note pertains to the 1948 Act.
2. See 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
3. 62 Stat. 609 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (1958).
4. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
5. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Keene v. United
States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Monroe, 150 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.
Cal. 1957).
6. United States v. Monroe, supra note 5 at 788. See also United States v. Beaver, 309
F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1962) ("That the claim and grant of the exemption were to be
pressed and obtained only through a regulated procedure ... appears... from the intent and
need manifested in these [statutory] provisions.") ; Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607
(9th Cir. 1959) ; Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959) ; United States v.
Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Wilson, 132 F. Supp. 485 (W.D.
La. 1955).
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the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training
and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philoso-
phical views or a merely personal moral code .... 7
There are strong arguments from the language of this and other portions of
the conscientious objector statute which suggest a construction conferring ab-
solute immunity from combatant or, in some cases, non-combatant service upon
any individual who demonstrates in a compliant manner his bona fide reaction
to participation in military service.8 An attitude favoring granting of the
exemption is further indicated by the provision for special procedural safe-
guards 9 against limitation by hostile claim boards 10 or presidential re-defini-
tion of the matter.'1 And the absence of a Congressional distinction between
objectors who come to realization of their beliefs early and those whose ob-
jections become firm in later years suggests a disinclination to discriminate on
the basis of the age of choice, as long as the choice is honest.
Nonetheless it is generally agreed that there are significant limitations on
the availability of total immunity. Objectors fall into two classes, both of
which remain obligated to serve in some capacity. If the objector is con-
scientiously opposed solely to personal involvement in the utilization of force,
the statute contemplates assignment to non-combatant activities, 12 usually the
7. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
8. The right to refrain from participation in military service has been held not to be
within the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion. United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Nonetheless,
Congress' provision for the exemption arose from "the traditionally high respect that dissent,
and particularly religious dissent, has enjoyed in our view of a free society . . . ." United
States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
Although this concern has never ripened into constitutional recognition, the traditional
importance of the conscientious objector exemption is evidenced by its inclusion in James
Madison's initial Bill of Rights proposals: "[N]o person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." 1 ANNALS OF CONGREnSS 440,
451 (1789). Even though Madison's proposal was defeated, the cause of the conscientious
objector has since been supported by numerous Congressional actions. See generally Russell,
Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 GE.o, WASH.
L. REv. 409 (1952) ; Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View i the Liqht of
Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252, 256-63 (1963). See also WRIGHTr, CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1931); AMERIcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE FACTS
ABOUT CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE UNITED STATES (1918) (treatment under the
Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917); U.S. WAR DEP'T, STATEMENT CONCrRNINO THE
TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE ARMY (1919) (treatment during World
War I) ; SIBLEY & WARDLAW, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN PRISON, 1940-1945 (1945)
(treatment during World War II). And for a word of caution against construing narrowly
the provisions of this exemption, see United States v. Greene, 220 F.2d 792, 794 (7th Cir,
1955) ; United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1953).
9. See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
10. CORNELL, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND THE LAW 23-24 (1943).
11. See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
12. 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 456(j) (1958).
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medical corps. 3 The more doctrinaire class of objectors, classified as I-0, who
are opposed to any personal association with the armed forces, will be re-
quired to perform "civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the na-
tional health, safety or interest" at tasks deemed appropriate by the local
board.14
More significantly, there may be pronounced limitations on immunity which
depend on the time of first filing of notice of conscientious objection by the
putative inductee. The most important of these arises from the apparent limita-
tion of availability of the statutory exemption to the pre-induction period. An
individual who has not asserted his objections prior to induction generally has
little opportunity to do so once within military jurisdiction."' It has usually
been considered that statutory authority grants, at best, a reassignment to non-
combatant service for the conscientious objector governed by General Mili-
tary Law.'6 Under this prevailing view, the doctrinaire objector can not find
the solace from repellent activity which would be available to him through an
I-0 exemption had he filed prior to induction. It is true that the armed services
are beginning to take a more liberal policy toward post-induction assertions of
conscientious objection, providing discharge as an alternative ;17 nonetheless,
the administrative hurdles an objector already under military jurisdiction must
face to achieve separation are formidable indeed. Instead of the elaborate pro-
cedural protection which is provided the claimant prior to induction in order to
guarantee a full and impartial hearing on the claim,18 the objector under mili-
tary jurisdiction must convince his unit commander that reassignment or dis-
charge is a fitting remedy in his case.19 But the possible hostility of a ranking
military officer to the existence of conscientious objection will in many cases
make the requirement of such permission an insurmountable barrier.
Since a sincere objector not given the opportunity to have his claim reviewed
before reporting for duty might find himself faced with this strict post-induc-
tion procedure, the extent to which hearing and right to appeal from an ad-
13. Army Reg. 614-260 (1958). See also Cornell, Exemption from the Draft: A
Study in Civil Liberties, 56 YAiE L.J. 258, 266 (1947).
14. 65 Stat. 86 (1951), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1958).
15. One army regulation governing treatment of conscientious objectors specifically
refers to the problem as one of reassignment, not discharge. The trainee claimant must con-
vince his unit commander of the sincerity of his objections; if he succeeds, he is reassigned to
the U.S. Army Medical Training Center. AR 614-260 (1958).
Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (1962) states in part:
[R]equest for discharge after entering military service, based solely on conscientious
objection which existed but was not claimed prior to induction or enlistment, cannot
be entertained. Similarly, requests for discharge based solely on conscientious objec-
tion claimed and denied by Selective Service prior to induction cannot be entertained.
Id. at 2.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958).
17. See, e.g., Army Regs. 135-25 (1962) and 635-20 (1962). For an application of Reg.
635-20,, see Jesse Jones Discharge, The Reporter for Conscience's Sake, May, 1963, p. 1.
18. See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 15 and 17 supra.
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verse decision are available prior to induction becomes crucial. The availability
of pre-induction recognition has been limited by an administrative rule pro-
mulgated by the Director of Selective Service, under a delegation of Presi-
dential authority to "prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out
[the Act's] provisions . . . ,,2o which has excised from the pre-induction
stages the very period of time which may be important for a wavering objector
to settle upon his final decision. The regulation, hereinafter referred to as
Regulation 1625.2, is a general rule applying to the qualifications for reopen-
ing any registrant classifications. It states:
The local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a
registrant (a) upon the written request of the registrant ... if such re-
quest is accompanied by written information presenting facts . . . which,
if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification; ...pro-
vided . . . the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the
local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induc-
tion ... unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a
change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which
the registrant bad no control.2 '
Since Orders to Report for Induction are commonly mailed about two
weeks before induction occurs,2 2 the effect of the proviso to the Regulation is
to shorten the availability of the exemption, and to affect the possibilities that
a scrupulous conscientious objector, who has been deliberate in arriving at
a mature grasp of the implications of his religious convictions, could ever
secure a hearing on the merits of his claim. In recent years, this regulation
as applied to conscientious objectors has come under increasing attack, both
on the ground that it violates a congressional intent, implicit in the statute,
that an opportunity for hearing be available until induction, 23 and on policy
grounds, that the regulation is unreasonable as not consonant with the reali-
ties of the decision-making processes that conscientious objectors undergo 4
20. 62 Stat. 619 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (1) (1958). The President's sub-
delegation of authority to the Director of Selective Service is authorized by 62 Stat. 621
(1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(c) (1958).
21. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1962) (Emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1962).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Underwood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
While regulation 1625.2 is not invalid on its face, it can have no applicability to a
claim of conscientious objection, whenever made, so as to deprive the objector of a
hearing at which he may prove his good faith.
Id. at 876; United States v. Brown, 129 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.N.J. 1955) ; United States v.
Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729, 730 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
24. See United States v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1962) (Bell, J., dissent-
ing) ; United States v. Brown, 129 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1955).
Under the terms of Regulation 1625.2, the local board may reopen the classification, even
after the Order to Report for Induction has been mailed, if "there has been a change in the
registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control,"
Who can say whether a change of conscience is a "circumstance over which the registrant
had no control"? Some courts have held that a change of conscience is such a circumstance.
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The majority of courts have rejected these contentions as based on a "strained
interpretation"-2 5 of the regulation and the statute, and in addition have held
that the regulation as applied to the conscientious objector situation is a "rea-
sonable part of an orderly administrative process."2 0 Consequently, the unsuc-
cessful claimants in these cases have been faced with the onerous choice of
service contrary to their convictions or the possibility of a criminal sentence of
"imprisonment for not more than five years [and] or a fine of not more than
$10,000 .... "27 Demonstrating their bona fides, numerous objectors have
elected to adhere to their beliefs rather than submit to induction orders. 2
At first glance, because of the brevity of the pre-induction period closed to
the potential inductee by Regulation 1625.2,29 the question of its validity may
seem a frivolous one. Many claims during the post-Order, pre-induction period
might be thought to be spurious, prompted more by momentary fears than
by deep conviction. Arguably, the typical candidate has had over twenty years to
reconcile his beliefs in a Supreme Being with his obligations to perform mili-
tary service. However, the impact of the Selective Service System structure
upon the individual may well be such that the individual may, quite honestly,
not be confronted with the final decision until the very weeks surrounding the
Order to Report for Induction. An individual's conviction that he is a con-
scientious objector arises from a constellation of experiences in a family and
church setting. It is implausible to assert that any one event in an individual's
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, mtpra; others have rejected this finding as "strained." See,
e.g., United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31, 33 (7th Cir. 1953).
In addition to the impracticable aspects of Regulation 1625.2, a close scrutiny of the en-
tire scheme of regulations under the Universal Military Training and Service Act strongly
suggests that the Selective Service Board itself, when initially promulgating the regulations,
did not envision that all such regulations would be applicable in a conscientious objector
situation. Regulation 16252, for example, appears in a series of similar regulations whose
terms suggest that they were drawn for application only to situations where change in status
could be identified with a discrete moment in time. Thus, in addition to the Regulation
1625.2 proviso requiring an externally-induced change in circumstance as a condition pre-
cedent to classification reopening, the immediately preceding rule, Regulation 1625.1, re-
quires all registrants to report "any fact that might result in the registrant being placed in
a different classification such as, but not limited to, any change in his occupational, marital,
military, or dependency status, or in his physical condition. . . ." within ten days of ac-
quiring knowledge of such a change. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1 (1962). Unlike student status or
physical disability, however, the precise moment in time in which conscientious objector
status "happens" is virtually impossible to identify: the causal elements are related to the
individual's whole past social and moral experience. Therefore, conceivably, a local board
could hold in every case that the operative facts concerning the realization of conscientious
objection occurred outside the Regulation 1625.1 time limit. But the possibility of such un-
desirable consequences resulting from the application to conscientious objector situations of
the time referent in Regulation 1625.1 casts serious doubt on the relevance to the same situa-
tions of the time referent in Regulation 16252.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31, 33 (7th Cir. 1953).
26. See note 6 supra.
27. 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APp. § 462(a) (1958).
28. See cases cited supra note 6. And see Cornell, note 13 supra at 268.
29. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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life is more determinative of his ultimate religious conviction than many
others.30 Given the importance of the decision to claim an exemption, and the
social stigma which often attaches to conscientious objector status,81 it is un-
derstandable that many registrants would hesitate to claim the exemption until
they felt certain of their own convictions and realized, because of the im-
mediacy of the pre-induction procedures, the inevitability of a clash between
their religious beliefs and combatant activity. Indeed, a scrupulous objector
may postpone an attempt at filing for an exemption until he is fully confident of
his stand, since he may well fear that betrayal of doubt during the hearing be-
fore the local board could result in its finding that the registrant was not a
"good faith" conscientious objector and thus not entitled to exemption. 2 Since
it eliminates the opportunity for a reopening of classification at that period
when freedom to reopen may be most meaningful for conscientious objectors,
it seems clear that the validity of Regulation 1625.2 should be tested as applied
to them.
30. Interviews with Clyde W. Summers, Professor, Yale Law School, Jan. & Feb.
1963. Professor Summers has, on many occasions, defended conscientious objectors. And
see discussion supra note 24.
31. Typical of the bias that our society maintains against conscientious objectors is the
following statement by Senator Wayne Morse when he proposed the creation of a National
Commission on Conscientious Objectors. Senator Morse is presently one of Congress'
staunchest supporters of the rights of conscientious objectors. But he readily admitted that
at an earlier date he had serious reservations concerning this group. While a member of the
War Labor Board, Morse received a letter from a conscientious objector seeking advice
on the course he should follow in securing a Government job:
I was somewhat shocked that this young conscientious objector failed to give any
evidence in his letter that he recognized that from an ethical standpoint he should
not consider that he had any right to seek to serve in a Government position on the
ground that he was a conscientious objector, when many of his own classmates al-
ready were on the battle lines in Europe, and some of them had already made the
supreme sacrifice....
I told him that under no circumstances would I help him get a civilian job in the
Government of the United States on the ground that he was a conscientious objector
and refused to put on the uniform of his country in the service of his country's Army
during war. I said, "So far as I am conerned, I think you should recognize that you
have control over your body, and you ought to offer your body to your country and
your conscience to your God."
94 CONG. REc. 7277 (1948).
See also the statement of Senator Connally in opposition to the amendment to exempt
divinity students:
The individual has to submerge himself. The welfare and the sovereignty and the
power of the Nation are the things we are trying to conserve; and in saying that
we should go back to the basic principle of absolute equality, of absolute uniformity,
of absolute universality of the duty to serve and the universality of call when the
Nation needs its sons to defend it.
86 CONG. REc. 10510 (1940).
And see CENTRAL CoMMITTEE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, HANDBOOK FOR CON-
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 51 (1957).
32. See CORNELL, op. cit. mpra note 10 at 20-29; cf. United States v. Annett, 108 F.
Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Okla. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 205 F2d 689 (1953).
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Certainly that regulation would be on most questionable grounds were it
possible to discover a clear congressional intent that the statute provide for
classification reopening at any point prior to induction, no matter what ad-
ministrative inconvenience is involved. Although all of its mandates concerning
the treatment of conscientious objectors do use the date of induction, not a
prior date, as a referent, the language of section 6(j) is ambivalent.33
Nevertheless, the structure of the statute strongly suggests induction as the
intended ultimate date for reopening of classification. Courts denying the ap-
plicability of Regulation 1625.2 to conscientious objectors have relied on the
absoluteness of the exemption, fastening upon the statement of section 6(j) that
"Nothing contained in this [Act] . . ." shall require subjection to combatant
training and service of any conscientious objector whose beliefs are religiously
based.3 4 The prohibitive impact is increased when this phrase is read in the con-
text of the scrupulous care which Congress has taken elsewhere in the statute to
ensure that no good faith claim for the exemption will be refused. Unlike un-
successful claimants for any other exemption,3 5 the conscientious objector claim-
ant is given a statutory right to appeal.3 Similarly, his appeal is first referred to
the Department of Justice "for inquiry and hearing"37 and the Department then
submits its findings to the appropriate Selective Service Appeal Board. More-
over, in making this inquiry the Department of Justice is instructed to look, not
to the length of time during which the objector has had his religious feelings,
but to his good faith at the present moment.38 This participation of the Depart-
ment of Justice is apparently designed to introduce a governmental agency less
intimately associated with the armed forces than the Selective Service System
and less hostile to the granting of conscientious objector status.30 Such intrusion
of a disinterested investigative body into the appeals hierarchy is unique to the
33. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1958).
34. Ibid. (emphasis supplied) ; see cases supra note 23.
35. Compare 50 U.S.C. APp. § 456(j) (1958) with the remaining subsections of §
456.
36. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1958).
37. Ibid.
38. The Act explicitly provides that upon appeal "the Department of Justice, after ap-
propriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and good fith of the
objections of the person concerned. .. ." 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APp. § 456(j)
(1958). See also H.R. REP. No. 2937, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1940). And for a discussion of
the principles upon which the "good faith" test operates, see 86 CoNG. REc. 10106 (1940)
(remarks of Senators Danaher and Sheppard).
39. See the proposal of Senator Mforse for the creation of a National Commission on
Conscientious Objectors to be composed of three or more civilians to be appointed by the
President:
[C]onscientious objectors believe that imposing upon them a procedure which gives
to the military, as the bill in effect now does, jurisdiction to render decisions on the
disposition of their cases, is itself rather irreconciliable with their views concerning
religious freedom.
94 CONG. REc. 7277,7278 (1948).
"[T is problem] should be separated from the general draft procedure. The problem,
1963] 1465
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
conscientious objector exemption and further signifies the pronounced con-
gressional solicitude for those who seek the exemption.
The power to limit the availability of conscientious objector status was
not denied the executive only through the provision of special procedural
protections. Further immunity is provided by a detailed definition of conscien-
tious objector status which is. beyond presidential authority to alter.' 0 In the
face of this clear limitation, it has been argued that a limitation such as that
constructed by Regulation 1625.2 does not rise to the dignity of an alteration
in status, but, while preserving the characteristics established for conscientious
objector exemption, only sets temporal limits to its availability. But this argu-
ment seems clearly fallacious. If such temporal limitations arose in a deferment
context as distinguished from exemptions, they would not be objectionable
since the statutory scheme explicitly contemplates such executive power.' 1
Similarly, limitations upon filing for such exemptions as physical disability and
hardship for dependents would also have a significantly less serious impact be-
cause of the possibility that post-induction discharge 0-a virtually impossible
remedy in the case of a conscientious objector-would provide relief, and since
moral alternatives would not be severe. But the distinction between temporal
availability of the exemption and control of conscientious objection status is
untenable, since there is an intimate nexus between the cumulative effect of
the pre-induction processes and the dilemma of the individual attempting to
make a decision whether or not to file for conscientious objection. Moreover,
presidential discretion limiting the availability of the exemption on the basis
of time seems unfounded since Congress made no distinction between un-
questioning and slowly maturing forms of belief, so long as they could be
shown to have arisen in a religious setting.43 If a maturing young man might
not reach firm decision on the matter until age twenty-three, and a presidential
regulation could terminate the right to claim at age twenty-one, whether or
not induction had occurred, the President's regulation would substantially have
limited what was fairly clearly intended to be a privilege beyond his capacity to
limit.
Despite recognition of these facts, it might seem that the proportion of
claims arising subsequent to Order to Report for Induction which will be
if it is proper to characterize any problem as a civilian problem, is clearly civilian in
its nature. It goes to the question of civilian rights under the Constitution....
Id. at 7304. And see CORNELL, op. cit. supra note 10.
40. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
41. For example, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i) (2) (1958) grants a right to student defer-
ment to the end of the academic year, but as to any additional deferment, "regulations
prescribed by the President pursuant to the provisions of subsection (h) of this section"
govern. Under subsection (h), the President may use his discretion in formulating defer-
ment policy "necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest." Thns
the President may redefine "national health, safety, or interest" so as to eliminate student de-
ferments.
42. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-21 (1958) (Physical Disability); Dependents Assistance Act of
1950, 64 Stat. 797 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 2201-16 at 2214 (1958).
43. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
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found to be lacking in good faith would justify a presumptive rule of evidence
upon which denial of hearing could be based.4 4 The fact that inevitability of
induction will normally appear at the time of physical examination, usually
several months before the mailing of the Order to Report for Induction, seems
to buttress the argument for such a presumption. But the use of such a pre-
sumptive rule to deny any hearing would appear to be contrary to the statutory
procedure. The good faith of a claim is irrelevant to the question whether the
classification should be reopened to permit a hearing on whether the claim is
in fact made in good faith. And the denial of classification reopening is made
in an ex parte proceeding with the effect that no hearing is ever held and no
opportunity to utilize the statutory appeal procedure is provided.45 Using such
irrebutable presumptions to decide the issue of good faith certainly facilitates
the task of the local board since it obviates an inquiry into the substantive ele-
ments in each case. But in the context of conscientious objector claims prior to
the mailing of induction orders, courts have rejected such presumptions by
balancing the consequences to the individual claimant against the interests of
the Selective Service Board.40 As has been seen, moreover, the receipt of
induction orders itself may play an important role in bringing a man to the
realization that he is a conscientious objector; thus the courts should be wary
of approving the presumption of lack of good faith that Regulation 1625.2 has
been interpreted to require. As that regulation has been applied, the cost of ad-
ministrative convenience may be a substantial diminution of congressionally
provided protections.
Finally, while some deprivation of individual rights might arguably be
countenanced if the administrative efficiencies gained thereby were consider-
able, examination of the burden of last minute statements of religious dissent
from military service on board administration indicates that the argument
against inefficiencies is not compelling in the post-Order-to-Report conscien-
tious objector context. During the two-year period prior to the Korean Con-
flict, slightly more than 0.1 per cent of all classifications resulted in conscien-
tious objector status for persons totally opposed to personal association with
the armed forces.4 7 A correspondingly small percentage of all claimants might
be expected to delay its claims until the post-Order-to-Report, pre-induction
time period, even were such claims possible, given the heavy burden of proof
which would inevitably face them. And, in contradistinction to a Ninth Circuit
44. Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Feuer v. United States,
208 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1953).
45. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
46. Where a local board has refused to reopen classification on a claim for conscientious
objector exemption made after registration but before mailing of induction orders, the courts
have insisted that the board hear the claim on its merits. Schuman v. United States, 203
F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1953). And see United States ex rel. Hull v. Stalter, 151 F2d 633 (7th
Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Clark, 105 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
47. U.S. GovEmMENT PRINTING OFFCE SELECrIV SERVICE UNDER TnE 1948 Act
219-21 (1951). For a detailed statistical compilation of Selective Service activities from
June 24, 1948 to July 9, 1950, see id. at 189-268.
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argument, it does not appear that late claims could be used by obstructionists
to "forever prevent the existence of a valid and effective order for induction,
no matter how sincere or insincere, compulsive or noncompulsive, his con-
science might be." 48 Not only would the registrant merely delay his induction
pending denial of his request, but he also could expect his unfavorable record
to follow him into the armed services. In extreme circumstances, the registrant
might find himself subject to criminal penalties for filing false claims. 49 And
if delay itself is the major problem, an expedited process of hearing and appeal
could be instituted without denying a registrant the right to a hearing and ap-
peal on his claim for exemption.
But the fundamental consideration which argues for the fullest possible ex-
tension of conscientious objection is the difficult choice facing the objector who
is denied exemption. Unlike the student, the disabled, or the supporter of de-
pendents, the conscientious objector may find prison the only moral alternative
to participation in military activities.r1 Recognizing the harshness of this
choice, and drawing upon a religious tradition, Congress has indicated by the
strength of its statutory command and the procedural safeguards it has built
around that command that it does not desire this choice to be forced upon any
citizen until the final order to step forward for swearing in is made at the in-
duction ceremony. To deny a hearing on the merits of the claim for conscien-
tious objector exemption because the Order to Report for Induction has been
mailed, and then to imprison the claimant or coerce him into military service,
makes no sense. As Circuit Judge Bell stated, dissenting in United States v.
Beaver:52
The statute gives this man exemption, the Army does not want him, the
jail will not change his religious beliefs, nor will the will of the people to
fight for their country be sapped by a generous adherence to the philoso-
phy behind this law.53
48. Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1959).
49. 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462(a) (1958).
50. A claim for conscientious objector exemption made after mailing of induction orders
could be routed for immediate hearing by the local board, and such claim could be given
priority in the appeals hierarchy if the claimant challenged an adverse decision. Thus any
delay resulting from a frivolous claim would be minimized, without denying a registrant the
right to a hearing and appeal on his claim for exemption.
51. See Cornell, note 13 supra at 268. See also CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS, op. cit. supra note 31 at 42-71. Note particularly the HANDIJooK'S discussion of
the character of prison life which prepares the objector for that distinct possibility. Id. at
55-71.
52. 309 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1962).
53. Id. at 279.
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